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Much has been written about economists
being rather gross fellows who pursue some-
thing even grosser called the Gross National
Product (GNP). In particular, it is asserted
that economists advocate growth in the GNP
regardless of its consequences for the en-
vironment and for all or most other civilized
amenities as well.
The truth of the matter is that many econ-
omists have long been concerned with envi-
ronmental problems—much longer, in fact,
than most physical scientists. Economists
long ago confronted these problems under
the heading of what they call "negative ex-
ternalities." For instance, many leading 19th
century economists addressed themselves to
such problems as the "dastardly effect of
smoky, cindery steam engines on the country-
side" and the kinds of economic taxes or ad-
justments that might alleviate thes.e problems.
They also gave attention to noise, odors and
similar unpleasant side effects of increasing
industrialization and to the costs that these
pollutants imposed upon the community.
Negative externalities were, indeed, a cen-
tral concern to economic theory in the first
two or three decades of this century. The only
topic that rivaled it in importance, at least
in the Anglo-Saxon countries, was probably
international trade. Many of the great names
in economics of that era are associated with
this interest in externalities: Pigou, Knight,
Marshall and Clark. Later, Simon Kuznets,
while laying the conceptual foundation for
modern national income accounting at the
National Bureau of Economic Research, was
very careful in his work to differentiate be-
tween income accounting with an emphasis
on available market measures and what would
be needed to gauge the growth of real income•
and welfare. Indeed, Kuznets pleaded (as
early as the 1930's) for an extension of the
conventional market measures in order to
capture non-market contributions to and de-
ductions from aggregate economic perform-
ance.
One could even argue that economists in
the first part of this century devoted entirely
too much time to environmental concerns.
One might suggest, for example, that it was
this preoccupation, among others, that left
economists totally unprepared intellectually
for the coming of the great depression in the
nineteen thirties. Instead of attempting to
determine what made the economy contract
and expand cyclically and what kinds of
policies would minimize or eliminate such
fluctuations, economists spent their time wor-
rying about noise, soot, smells and smoke
created by such diversely offensive manifes-
tations of industrialization as the steam en-
gine, stockyards, chemical plants and the like.
Needless to say, all that changed,though
rather more slowly than it should have, when
Note: Presented to the Western Electric Environmental Seminar, New York City, December
1971—an experiment in interdisciplinary exchange of information and views on a contempo-
rary problem of concern.the Great Depression arrived. By the early
1940's, if not before, economics as an aca-
demic discipline and science had been "revo-
lutionized" by a combination of Keynes'
theory and Kuznets' measures of aggregate
market activity (as perfected in the U. S. De-
partment of Commerce and other govern-
ment agencies). Certainly, from 1940 through
1967, the economic profession did focus a
very substantial part of its energies upon the
issues of eliminating business cycle fluctua-
tions and of keeping the economy growing at
a rate sufficient to absorb the available and
increasing supply of manpower.
But, this trend ended in the late 1960's.
At that point the environmental issue began
to "re-emerge"—and, in a way that at first was
quite startling to economists since they were
characterized as being in some way major vil-
lains contributing to environmental deteriora-
tion. Yet, the first new or mid-1960
tees on environmental quality in the Federal
Government were chaired and encouraged by
the then Chairman of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, Gardner Ackley (who is now
a member of the National Bureau's Board of
Directors).
Economists, when thus confronted, did that
which' usually 'comes naturally when any dis-
cipline faces new challenges: they reached
back into their intellectual history to see if
there were' any guidelines or suggestions for
handling these problems. It was easy enough
to identify that the concepts of so-called "wel-
fare economics," and particularly the con-
tributions of Pigou, were potentially quite
applicable. The main policy prescription to
be found in that body of economic thought
was that polluters should be taxed for the
act of polluting. In a market economy pro-
ducers could be expected to respond to these
taxes by reducing 'pollutionby whatever
amounts seemed most efficient in light of the
socially or politically determined price (i.e.,
cost) attached to the act of pollution. In es-
sence, this act of' attaching price or tax to
pollution would make it possible to "inter-
nalize" pollution activities into producers'
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decision making processes and thereby also
into the market system on which we rely for
determining the allocation'of resources within
our society. In short, the economist would say
that the sensible way to set environmental
standards is to determine what costs are at-
tached to harming the environment and then
set a tax to reflect these costs so that individ-
ual producers and businessmen, as well as
consumers, adjust their activities correspond-
ingly.
In keeping with this emphasis on the mar-
ket mechanism, economists also emphasized
that reducing pollution or improving the en-
vironment almost invariably involves new or
additional costs of one kind or another. Or
to put it rather more dramatically, to a con-
siderable extent we have relied too much On
the assimilative capacity of our environment
to absorb pollution created by production
and consumption; we must recognize that the
absorptive capacity of nature may well be
limited and therefore is a scarce resource
which needs to be priced like any other
scarce resource. In essence, treating nature
as a free good has led us to overuse it!
Accordingly, as step in intelligently
analyzing environmental problems, econo-
mists would recommend that we determine
the valuations placed on environmental im-
provements. Moreover, using a most funda-
mental economic theorem, the rational way
to prOceed with environmental improvement
is to do so as long as the marginal costs of
such improvement are less than the marginal
benefits. From the economist's standpoint the
proper environmental standard, always as-
suming that we have properly and fully meas-
ured benefits and costs, is determined by the
intersection of the relevant marginal benefit
and cost curves.
It should also be clear what the economist's
approach excludes. In particular, it abhors
oversimplified statements to the effect that
"we must" eliminate this or that source of
pollution "entirely." Such drastic either-or
statements 'are to the economist simply emo-
tional oversimplifications. The economist isparticularly disturbed when he observes, as
he often does, that the costs of eliminating
pollution or of improving the environment
tend to rise steeply as we approach some
idealized goal of zero pollution or of perfec-
tion in our environment. The economist fur-
ther realizes that the resources that may be
squandered on this pursuit of an idealized
perfection are likely to be resources that may
not be available for other very worthy pur-
poses, such as. reduction of poverty or im-
provement of our educational system.
The economist also tends to view dimly
those phophets of doom and gloom who insist
that short of such perfection our society will
drop into some abyss or cataclysmic trauma.
Apparently, many physical scientists work
with models that embody a great deal of in-
stability, that is have a tendency to degenerate
into some extreme boundary condition when
disturbed. The economist's experience,in•
contrast, is with systems of considerable sta-
bility; he observes that the economic system
when dislodged from equilibrium has a strong
tendency not to move exponentially toward
some boundary but rather tends to react or
move back toward equilibrium. In particular,
the economistidentifies many corrective
in human or social systems that
tend to keep man from behaving utterly fool-
ishly. I will admit, though, that I am not
totally convinced that the economist's opti-
mism about human nature and institutions is
always well placed; nevertheless, I think that
theeconomist'sgeneralizationabout the
stability of social systems stands up reason-
ably well to the test of empirical observation.
In short, the economist's typical advice
about environmental standards would be:
Have the public state what environmental
protection is worth, apply a tax reflecting this
valuation and let the market mechanism do
the rest. But economists, being the argumen-
tative fellows that they are, haven't been con-
tent to let matters stand at this. One group
within the profession insists that the whole
problem of environmental damage, pollution
and other negative externalities is a "phony,
trumped-up piece of nonsense" that w.ould
be quickly corrected in any good market
economy, such as that of the United States,'
by those who are harmed striking bargains
with those who do the harming. Discussion
of how private bargains could eliminate the
problem has led to some very interesting
economic theory but not to much insight into
the real problems of environmental main-
tenance. In essence, these models (in which
the pollution problem disappears as a public
concern) are based on assumptions that bear
little resemblance to the realities of the Amer-
ican economy—or for that matter almost any
other economy. An ex-president of the Amer-
ican Economic Association, Kenneth Bould-
ing, has even 'gone so far as to characterize
some of these contributorsas "our (the
economics profession's) lunatic fringe who
virtually deny the existence of public goods
and public bads and think that all things can
be done by private bargains between smoky
railroads and rational dairy farmers."
The majority of the profession, in fact, has
adopted a rather more pragmatic approach.
Their starting point has been to worry whether
the simple prescription of pollution' taxes was
really enough or necessarily the best way of
attacking environmental problems in all pos-
siblecircumstances. Furthermore, some econ-
omists, usually those with more practical
experience, also wondered about the adminis-
trative practicality of using taxes in many
applications.
Actually many, if not most, economists
have apparently come to the conclusion that
probably taxes aren't necessarily the only or
even always the best solution. In a world in
which the market works, but not necessarily
all that perfectly, the imposition of a pollution
tax frequently could actually reduce total
welfare in the society. For example, if one
imposed a pollution tax on a monopolist,, this
could result in his reducing production—and
it is a simple truth of economic theory that
monopolists tend to produce less of their
goods than is usually optimal from a social
standpoint, even without pollution' taxes. One
3perverse result is that in such cases, every-
thing else equal (a big assumption!) and other
policy solutions not being available, govern-
ment perhaps 'should subsidize monopolists
to reduce their pollution; indeed, on purely
economic grounds it might be desirable to
carry that subsidy to the point of exceeding
the actual costs of whatever equipment was
required to eliminate the monopolists' en-
vironmental harm. Needless to say, I shall
leave it to others to sell that particular propo-
sition to Congressmen!
Economists, though, hardly are enthusias-
tic about subsidies (e.g., for acquiring equip-
ment to reduce pollution) as a universal solu-
tion to environmental problems. Quite the
contrary, economists believe such subsidies
should be avoided wherever possible since,
in essence, a subsidy amounts to subsidizing
patterns of consumption and production that
are high in pollution content. One of the
great appeals of the tax approach is that in
the long run it should induce people to con-
sume less of the goods turned out by polluting
activities and lead producers to use such
processes less in production.
Economists have also been concerned that
taxes as a solution to environmental problems
could weigh heavily upon small producers or
firms, thus running contrary to the whole
thrust of anti-trust and other competitive
policies promoted by governmental agencies.
In the same vein, the imposition of taxes
could have some very curious redistributive
effects within our economy; for example, a
tax imposed by a federal or state environ-
mental protection agency on contaminated
municipal sewage effluents would work di-
rectly counter to "revenue sharing" or other
programs intended to alleviate the fiscal prob-
lems of cities. Furthermore, there are very
practical difficulties with tax solutions to
environmental problems,e.g.,determining
the appropriate tax level could be an ex-
tremely difficult and complex process. And
once one moved to a consideration of a
dynamic economy, with investment decisions
and planning carried out over a long time
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horizon,the complexities and unforeseen
adverse side effects of anti-pollution taxes
could (and probably would) multiply.
As a consequence of these and many sim-
ilar considerations, all inducing caution or
reservation about simply imposing taxes on
effluents, economists have been led to look
ever more kindly on straight regulation or
physical controls as a means of solving en-
vironmental problems. This has occurred in
spite of the fact that economists generally
consider the application of physical controls
or standards as being potentially arbitrary
and often self-defeating in a reasonably free
market economy. Nevertheless, some profes-
sional consensus has emerged that in many
cases simply setting regulations or physical
standards might be the easiest and perhaps
the best solution achievable. Certainly, such
an approach would usually be preferred by
economists to the use of subsidies—though
important exceptions might be expected, as
already noted.
As a consequence of all this, economists
have become rather eclectic in their approach
to environmental problems, that is a bit less
dogmatic than their usual custom. Along with
this new eclecticism, economists also have
become increasingly impressed with the im-
portance of institutional arrangements, in
particular the need of creating new and pos-
sibly very different kinds of governmental
agencies, as part of the environmental solu-
tion. Regional planning agencies have come
into particular favor.
In essence,this conversion of market-
oriented economists to advocacy of planning
was induced by a growing recognition that
many environmental problems involved a
remarkable number of interdependencies and
what economists would call complex general
'equilibrium problems. A regional watershed
or river valley provides a particularly good
illustration of these. For example, a minimal
cost solution to depolluting a river usually
involvesverycomplexdecisions:about
where to locate treatment plants; what kinds
of relocation of. industrial activity, if any, oneshould require; which communities and in-
dustries one should group together to achieve
scale economies in treatment; and where and
to what extent one might take advantage of
natural assimilation. Air pollution problems
demonstrate many of the same characteristics.
Similarly, it has been recognized for some
time that regional planning on a fairly exten-
sive scale is the only sensible way to approach
several transportation planning problems,
for example airport location and highway
alignments.
In short, economists have taken what one
could describe as more of a "systems ap-
proach" to environmental problems and in-
creasingly find themselves collaborating with
engineersand otherdisciplines.Systems
analysisis,of course, perfectly consistent
with adopting a more eclectic approach to
the setting of environmental policies. For
example, a regional agency dealing with one
or more classes of pollution problems might
well find it expeditious to use a mix of subsidy,.
tax incentives and regulatory standards to
achieve a minimum or lower cost solution to
its problems. Indeed, and as by my
previous remarks, such a mixed strategy may
be absolutely essential.
If all this seems a bit less emphatic or
clearcut in its policy implications than some
would wish, I would say so be it. I am afraid
that problems of economic externalities, of
which environmental problems are only one
example, are exceedingly complex and diffi-
cult, especially when we move from the sim-
plified models of economic analysis to the
realities of policy. Notwithstanding these ob-
vious imperfections or limitationsof the
economist's contribution, I am also willing
to argue that the economist is rather more
advanced in his thinking on practical solu-
tions to these problems than most of his
academic colleagues in other disciplines. To
again quote Kenneth Boulding:
By comparison with the ignorance and
even obscurantism of the natural scien-
tist [on these environmental problems],
economics stands out like a clear beacon
of eighteenth century enlightenment.
5GROWTH: MEETING THE CHALLENGE
by
Edward K. Smith
National Bureau of Economic Research
The betterment of mankind has always
been the highest concern of Western civiliza-
tion. It is a recurring theme of our poetry
and novels. It is evidenced in our art and.
music. It is the basis of much of our religious
and philosophical thought. And, of course,
it is expressed in our political and economic
institutions.
It should not be surprising, then, that every
age has aspired to improve man's condition.
It should not be surprising, either, that in
every age, no matter how great its power to
advance man's welfare, there have been those
who have not deemed their own era a re-
sounding success. Since man has been record-
ing his fate, complaints have been registered
that his progress has been either too fast or
too slow, his institutions too rigid or too
shaky, his ideas too radical or too conserva-
tive, his future too uncertain, his past too
neglected, his aspirations too great, and his
performance too little.
Why should we, therefore, be surprised that
in our own time, our own institutions and aims
should be neither wholly accepted nor proven
to be wholly workable? When has there been,
ever, total devotion to and perfection in man's
affairs?
Thus, in our age, the age of scientific man,
we. always find debate on the proper ends of
mankind hinging on the uses to which science
can be put; and, once science has been put to
use, on whether or not the application is suc-
cessful or proper. When scientific progress
was sporadic and slow, our institutions had
at least more time to debate and to adapt to
the implications of change. But now it is com-
mon knowledge that in this and the last cen-
turies our scientific and technical advance has
proceeded so much more rapidly, and the ap-
plication of knowledge has created so many
more uses for and demands on our physical
and spiritual resources, that questions under-
standably arise as to the ability of our institu-
tions —socialand economic —toencompass
and control the multitudinous effects of such
changes.
Our present day is but a moment in the
history of man, but to us it is an important
moment, because we now realize that our
ability to do the right thing or the wrong thing
is likely to have a much greater impact on
future generations than in previous genera-
tions.
But perspective is needed. The cries of
alarm at what we now do are, if history is any
guide, exaggerated. Man has demonstrated
that he will not queue up for disaster indefi-
nitely, our instincts for self-preservation be-
ing as strong as our penchant for predicting
disaster itself. Indeed, our historically dem-
onstrated unease over the future is deep in
our psyche, and stems from our instinct for
self-preservation and our wonderment about,
the purposes of life and the meanings of
death.
For our own civilization, and especially in
the countries of Western Europe and Amer-
ica, the present age has been characterized
most by a rapid and substantial improvement
in the material well-being of man. This bene-
fit has not been without its costs, both material
Note: This is an amended version of a luncheon address to the Northeast Industrial Developers
Association's Annual Conference, Manchester, N. H., Oct. 3, 1972.
6and otherwise. Some of these costs are meas-
urable and have been measured. Some are
measurable but have not been measured. And
some are immeasurable, but are thought to
have been measured.
Two major variables that affect our aver-
age well-being are population and industrial
production. They have been growing at ex-
ponential rates. But our physical resources
are fixed, in the sense that the world has
bounds. Further, substantial elements in our
present system of production appear to have
side effects that are unaccounted for and are
deleterious and possibly disastrous for our
well-being. Put all these together and you
get the proposition that at some time the lim-
its to expansion will be reached; that, given
exponential population growth and the great
increase in output and consumption attend-
ant to it, the system is bound to reach its
limits sooner rather than later; and that the
consequent disasters may be more traumatic
as a result of their appearing too soon for us
to adapt ourselves to them.
This argument is not new. It was given in
its purest form by T. R. Malthus, the parson
turned economist. Every student of elemen-
tary economics has been exposed to the prop-
osition advanced by Malthus that the world
population was going to outrun the food sup-
ply, so that starvation would ensue as the
final limit to population With the
technological advances inagriculture,his
gloomy prediction happily did not material-
ize. But the proposition he advanced did not
die with lack of proof. It has attained new
life and vigor by admitting as an exponential
variable one that Malthus assumed to be a
constant —technology.Technologyisthe
means whereby we not only exploit the earth's
resources but also raise consumption per
head. This ever-increasing consumption on
the part of an ever-increasing population, this
pushing back of the law of diminishing re-
turns—while sustaining the present—will, it is
said, impoverish the future. To make matters
worse, the less developed nations are cited as
examples of both Maithusian versions, the
new and the old,' at work at the same time.
The developed nations, on the other hand,
with their voracious appetites for resources,
are accused of using up the world's natural
wealth at a rate that will only speed up the
process, to the ultimate detriment of rich na-
tion and poor nation alike.
These are not the only effects of growth
which are viewed with alarm. Our industrial
technology produces a volume of effluents
that pollute and sometimes even destroy our
air, our rivers, lakes, and seas, and our bodily
mechanisms. Indeed, a long list of bad effects
of the industrial and scientific age has been
drawn up, long enough for many to call for
an immediate indictment of growth before the
bar of history.
On the basis of this reasoning, growth, is
not only condemned, it is denied—denied in
the sense that, while admittedly our modern
age has increased its output, it has not in-'
creased its welfare. According to this line of
argument, our growth is not real, or at the
very least, nowhere as. real as we. think it is,
for we have neglected to count all the costs.
A growing gross national product is not the
proper measure of our well-being. We need
new measures of our well-being. GNP may be
at the base of these measures, but much else
has to be included, and many adjustments to
or deductions from GNP have to be made
before we are able to get ,a proper. 'evaluation
of reality. Our system of income and product
accounts is said to be suspect, especially be-
cause it does not give a true picture of eco-
nomic welfare and virtually ignores measur-
ing social welfare.
Thus, we have been not only worshiping a
false god—growth—but also measuringthe ef-
fects of growth, and growth itself, incorrectly.
The climate of opinion has changed'dramati-
cally. Growth is suspect.
Is it obsolete? If so, this is' a sorry state of
affairs. Before bitter despair sets in, perhaps
we had better investigate the allegations. This
the National Bureau is doing, true to its his-
tory of seeking facts and tested measures of
economic performance rather than subjective
7opinions. Our past research that has led to
the development of and improvement in the
national income and product accounts as pri-
mary measures of economic performance and
the path-breaking work of Simon Kuznets on
economic growth, for which he was awarded
the Nobel prize in economics, are now being
extended by new investigations into an ex-
panded set of economic and social accounts.
These include measures of nonmarket time
use, the division of output between current
and future use, and the economic and social
costs associated with environmental change.
In this connection, James Tobin and William
Nordhaus of Yale have completed for the
Bureau a very interesting and important piece
of work which is a pioneering attempt to
quantify some of the important differences
between the concept of goods and services
produced in the market and the welfare con-
cept of goods and services available for ulti-
mate consumption. Their study, published in
one of the National Bureau's 50th Anniver-
sary Colloquium Series, that on Economic
Growth, is entitled "Is Growth Obsolete?"
Tobin and Nordhaus discuss the develop-
ment of economic growth theory from the
classical theory of the stationary state to mod-
ern neoclassical growth theory and the ac-
ceptance of the economic growth norm and
its proclamation in the early 1960's as an ob-
jective of government policy: to get the econ-
omy to produce at its potential, and perhaps
to raise that potential by accelerating the pro-
ductivity of labor and increasing the accumu-
lation of human and physical capital. Growth
advocates have always been aware of the dif-
ficulties of increasing growth rates and of the
necessity for sacrificing present consumption
for the benefit of future generations. Thus,
Tobin and Nordhaus note both that those
who advocate growth place future above
present and that, ironically, "the antigrowth
men of the 1970's believe that it is they who
represent the claims of a fragile future against
a voracious present."
They direct their attention to three prob-
lems raised by those who question the desira-
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bility and possibility of future growth. First,
the usefulness of output measures for evalu-
ating the growth of economic welfare; second,
the question of whether the growth process
must waste our natural resources; and third,
how the rate of population growth—especially
zero population growth—affects economic
welfare.
In meeting their first problem, Tobin and
Nordhaus construct, within the existing na-
tional income and product accounts (NIPA),
a new measure of economic welfare (MEW).
I will not trouble you with all of the compli-
cated adjustments and many pitfalls inherent
in constructing such a measure. The authors
admit their measure is "primitive and experi-
mental"—but itis a measure, at least—and
I think it a remarkable start toward the kind
of work that needs to be done to guide us in
the future.
Briefly, the work involved adjusting per-
sonal consumption by (1) deducting instru-
mental expenditures (i.e., intermediate rather
than final goods) such as defense and sanita-
tion expenditures, durable goods and other
household investments, and an amount for
"disamenities of urbanization," and by
(2) adding the services of consumer capital,
an imputation for leisure, and an imputation
for nonmarket activities, along with govern-
ment consumption and the services of gov-
ernment capital, to arrive at MEW total con-
sumption (MEW net investment is deducted
to arrive at sustainable MEW). MEW is, then,
quite different from our conventional meas-
ures of output.
The authors conclude that per ca pita MEW
has been growing at a 1.1 percent annual
rate since 1929, while net national product,
the conventional measure, has been growing
at 1.7 percent annually. Thus, "the progress
indicated by conventional national accounts
is not just a myth that evaporates when a
welfare-oriented measure is substituted." Our
growth is real, both materially and in terms
of economic welfare.
So far as natural resources go, the Tobin-
Nordhaus simulations, made both over athree-hundred-year and a fifty-year period,
imply that "growth will accelerate rather than
slow down even as natural resources become
more scarce in the future." Their results are
consistent with the fact that the substitution
of capital and labor for resources is high (sig-
nificantly greater than unity), or that techno-
logical change is relatively resource-saving,
or both. Tobin and Nordhaus have not found
evidence to support the fear that natural re-
sources will be an increasingly severe drag on
economic growth. Indeed, the opposite is
true: "Growth of output per capita will, ac-
celerate ever so slightly even as stocks of
natural resources decline."
We all know that population growth can-
not continue forever. There is little to guide
us in developing a theory of fertility to fit the
observed facts, however. The National Bu-
reau's work under the direction of Victor
Fuchs and others is continuing research on
fertility patterns and their economic deter-
minants. Tobin and Nordhaus concluded that
"in a ZPG equilibrium sustainable consump-
tion per capita would be 9-10 percent higher
than in a steady state. of 2.1 percent growth
corresponding to 1960 fertility and mortality,
and somewhat more than 3 percent higher
than in asteady state of 0.7 percent growth
corresponding to 1967 fertility and mortal-
ity." They also found that "as between 1960
equilibrium and ZPG, the diminished drag of
resource limitations is worth about one-tenth
of 1 percent per annum in growth of per cap-
ita
Their conclusion:
Although GNP and other national in-
come aggregates are imperfect measures
of welfare, the broad picture of secular
progress which they convey remains
after correction of their most obvious
deficiencies. At present there is no rea-
son to arrest general economic growth
to conserve natural resources, although
there is good reason to provide proper
economic incentivestoconserve re-
sources which currently cost their users
less than true social cost. Population
growth cannot continue indefinitely, and
evidently it is already slowing down in
the United States. This slowdown will
significantlyincreasesustainableper
capita consumption. But even with ZPG
there is no reason to shut off techno-
logical progress. The classical station-
ary state need not become our utopian
norm.
I might say that, as to a choice between
zero. population growth or zero economic
growth, the former need not result in an un-
acceptable state of affairs, but the latter un-
doubtedly will. ZPG can, under the proper
conditions, raise per capita welfare, but zero
economic growth will make it very difficult
to avoid internal social and political stress.
But I wish to go beyond the conclusions
reached by Tobin and Nordhaus. It is folly
to ignore the political and social effects that
might ensue from a blind adherence to the
notion of a stationary state. While we may
all agree that growth per se.isnot an end to
be sought as a thing in and for itself, it would
be foolish of us to attack technological change
when technological change may be the only
effective route to an increase in the general
welfare of man, or to attack education and
science because education and science can be
misdirected, or to turn to .antiscientific and
Luddite behavior because science and ma-
chines have not brought us Heaven in our
time. The fact that we do not live in paradise
has long been recognized, but this does not
mean, that the alternative is on earth.
And surely a no-growth economy will create
troubles. For .example,will domestic tran-
quility increase when the poor ask the rich
for a larger share of the. unchanging total
product (or a total product which increases
only enough to keep per capita product con-
stant)?
A no-growth economy will have to beg re-
sources from one use to put them to work
elsewhere; government revenues will not cre-
ate via the fiscal dividend the wherewithal to
finance new programs considered socially
necessary; and the resources necessary to win
the battle against pollution, poverty, and dis-
ease will be harder to come by, not easier.
9The prospects, however, for a stable-state,
no-growth economy coming into existence
after a long history of growth which has
shown the way to progressive improvement
in mankind are slim. In the first place, it is
politically unlikely. In addition, it is techno-
logically unlikely. This is an important, and
too often neglected, point. We must not for-
get that, even if we wanted to,probably
could not invent a political system and a so-
cial ethic that would contain, restrain, or
prevent technological change. We would lit-
erally have to overturn Western civilization
and its ethical norms. We would have to com-
pletely control science. Science has a life of
its own. We cannot predict where it will go,
or take us; if we knew, we would already be
in possession of the secrets of the universe.
Nor can we control or inhibit the minds of
men. We will always tinker with our world.
The problem is to put scientific method and
scientific results to the proper uses of man-
kind. Antiscientific biases lead only toward
myth and simplistic solutions, with all their
ideological dangers.
Thus, my view of the no-growth economy
is that, however undesirable or unnecessary
it may be from an economic point of view,
it is far more undesirable, indeed dangerous,
from a political point of view.
So far as ZPG goes, the most recent census
projections show us now to be at a reproduc-
tion rate of 2.1, or about the ZPG rate in the
absence of immigration.
We have found, then, that there is substan-
tial evidence not only from our observations
of the historical development but also from
the Tobin-Nordhaus work that the answer to
the question "Is growth obsolete?" is no. And
if it is no from the point of view of economic
welfare, it certainly reinforces the necessity
10
of growth from a political and social view.
The choice before us is not to slow down or
to stop growth. It is to direct growth, as best
we can, into useful and socially productive
channels.If. our population growth slows
down, consumption per capita can continue
to rise without serious effect on our resources.
And certainly the poorer nations will demand
a significant increase in their material well-
being, even if we do not.
However optimistic we might be about
events in the future, there are sure to be cries
of impending doom. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the recent The Limits to
Growth, which was given the endorsement of
the Club of Rome and greeted with much f an-
fare a short while ago. Carl Kaysen, in a per-
ceptive and pointed review in Foreign Affairs
entitled "The Computer That Printed Out
W*O*L*F*," rightly takes issue with its ma-
jor conclusions. Systems Dynamics and the
invocations of the computer combined to pro-
duce a good deal of nonsense. Kaysen shows
why the "authors' analyses are gravely defi-
cient and many of their strongest and most
striking conclusions unwarranted." This work
predictscatastrophe,about a .generation
away, with a point of no return if we go on
as we have been. The argument follows the
one I mentioned previously, essentially the
new Malthusian cause. But, as Kaysen points
out, the computer cried W*O*L*F*, for the
conclusiohs lack analytic underpinning, no
matter how important the questions raised
may be. Thus, the prescriptions are wrong
and the urgency with which they are advanced
misplaced. There are many more immediate
and pressing problems. With Kaysen I think
we can all say: "A good sentry does not cry
up tomorrow's wolves and ignore today's
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